Epistemic Injustice and Powerlessness in the Context of Global Justice. An Argument for “Thick” and “Small” Knowledge by Schweiger, Gottfried
Epistemic Injustice and Powerlessness in the Context of Global Justice 
© Wagadu 2016 ISSN: 1545-6196 
SIX 
 
EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AND 
POWERLESSNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
GLOBAL JUSTICE: AN ARGUMENT FOR 
“THICK” AND “SMALL” KNOWLEDGE 
 
Gottfried Schweiger 
Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research 
Paris-Lodron-Universität Salzburg 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I present an analysis of the “windows 
into reality” that are used in theories of global justice with a 
focus on issues of epistemic injustice and the powerlessness of 
the global poor. I argue that we should aim for a better 
understanding of global poverty through acknowledging people 
living in poverty as epistemic subjects. To achieve this, we 
need to deepen and broaden the knowledge base of theories of 
global justice and approach the subject through methodologies 
of “thinking small” and “thick descriptions”, which are ways to 
give people living in poverty sufficient room to express 
themselves and have their voices heard, leading to “small” and 
“thick” knowledge claims. 
 
Introduction 
Global justice is first and foremost concerned with “material” 
injustices, such as poverty and a lack of basic goods, while the 
underlying system of knowledge production, namely the 
production and distribution of our knowledge about these 
injustices and about how they can be overcome, is largely 
neglected. This comes with a reliance of most concepts of 
global justice on a specific form of third-person knowledge, 
which can be characterized as distant, “big”1, unpersonal, 
“thin”2 and objectified. Such knowledge presents us with 
figures and numbers about hundreds of millions of people 
living in misery, but the “voices” and experiences of the 
victims of injustices are marginalized in this kind of knowledge 
and therefore under-represented in concepts of global justice. In 
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order to overcome this shortcoming, I argue for a greater 
concern with “thick” and “small” third-person knowledge, 
which necessitates work with first-person testimonials, 
narratives and life stories. It is not a question of either/or, but a 
balance between different kinds of knowledge bases. 
“Windows into reality” are needed, otherwise many injustices 
will simply go unnoticed, unheard and will ultimately not be 
criticized, constituting an epistemic injustice. 
My paper is structured in four sections: Every concept 
of global justice needs a “window into reality” to know what 
injustices to criticize and how to overcome them. In the first 
section, I argue that concepts of global justice rely mainly on 
“big” and “thin” third-person knowledge about global 
injustices, and I explain why this increases the risk of 
neglecting certain forms of injustices. In the second section, I 
turn to epistemic injustices that are embedded within global 
injustices resulting in poverty and exclusion as well as in the 
production of knowledge about these injustices. Concepts of 
global justice that rely on “big” and “thin” third-person 
knowledge are often not concerned with the production of this 
kind of knowledge and the ways epistemic injustices are 
present in it. Besides being the victims of harsh injustices, the 
global poor are also trapped in a state of epistemic 
powerlessness. In the following third section, I propose the 
concepts of “thick” and “mall” third-person knowledge to 
empower the victims of (epistemic) injustices by giving them 
the opportunity to tell their stories and their experiences. Thus, 
people acquiring this kind of knowledge should be able to gain 
deep insights into such injustices and into the ways they affect 
the victims and their lives. In the fourth and final section I 
argue for a balance between different types of “windows into 
reality” and connect this matter to issues of empowerment and 
recognition. 
 
Theories of Global Justice and “Windows into Reality” 
Theories of global justice often start with the observation that 
our contemporary world is radically unjust, and they try to 
come-up with answers that can help us to remove these 
injustices. Furthermore, most theories of global justice 
acknowledge that they rely on empirical findings they cannot 
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produce themselves, including data about the state of the 
world’s poor, the conditions they live in, the institutional 
arrangements on the national and global level that produce, 
reproduce or reduce poverty as well as the political and legal 
systems that shape these arrangements. According to many 
theorists, global justice, if it wants to be considered as a venture 
that is as feasible as it is reasonable, has to take these non-ideal 
circumstances and the limits they pose into account, not only 
for the realization of global justice but also with regard to its 
conceptualization. This point is made strongly by the so-called 
non-ideal camp, whose proponents argue that we need to know 
a lot about the world to apply and to design theories of justice – 
opposed to the so-called ideal camp, whose proponents argue 
that we should refrain from as much empirical influence as 
possible when we design theories of justice (Valentini, 2012). 
One of the reasons for opting for a non-ideal approach is the 
intention of most theorists of global justice to propose so-called 
real-life answers instead of theoretical daydreams. I would like 
to call this the necessity to have a “window into reality” that 
connects the philosophical work with the real world it aims to 
analyze, enabling theorists to criticize and to make proposals on 
how it could become better and more just. These windows are 
certain types of knowledge. Only rarely have theorists of global 
justice systematically reflected on the grounds and the ways in 
which they use such “windows into reality” or on the kind of 
knowledge they put to work in their theories. Let us distinguish 
three types of knowledge, following a similar analysis 
conducted by Clemens Sedmak (2013): third-person, second-
person and first-person knowledge. 
Scientific studies are the most prominent example of 
third-person knowledge. This kind of knowledge is distant, 
which means that there is not necessarily a connection between 
the producers of such knowledge and those who use it in their 
theories of global justice. It appears to be objective, because it 
is produced according to shared rules; accordingly, it is 
presumed to be trustworthy and reliable. We can distinguish 
two types of such scientific knowledge along the distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative empirical research. Most 
empirical findings at the heart of theories of global justice are 
quantitative: they are “big” in the sense that they cover millions 
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or billions of people, different countries, genders, age groups 
etc. Their scope also increases the distance in the sense of the 
old saying that one death is a tragedy, one millions deaths are a 
statistic. Qualitative findings are “smaller” and cannot be 
generalized – some say they are less reliable – because they 
cover less ground and because they are closer to the real life of 
those who are covered in the research. They are not as often 
found in theories of global justice, because the latter have a 
tendency to think big. 
Second-person knowledge is the kind of knowledge we 
obtain when other people tell us something they have 
experienced.3 For example: If I work in a shelter or refugee 
home in an affluent society, I have the opportunity to hear a 
wide range of stories from people who were compelled to flee 
from their homes. In some sense, such knowledge is perceived 
as much less reliable for its use in theories of global justice 
when compared to third-person knowledge. On the one hand, 
second-person knowledge does not cover as much ground as 
the big knowledge of quantitative studies by the World Bank or 
other sources, even though the story I am told might be tragic 
and I might believe in its truth. On the other hand, I have no 
way of knowing if it is more than a single or local incident. The 
reliability is furthermore shattered because second-person 
knowledge is neither considered as scientific, nor does it not 
come with the label of objectivity. People can and also have the 
right to tell their own perspective, however, in the context of 
theories of global justice such stories usually need to be 
backed-up by scientific procedures of data gathering and 
analysis. Nonetheless, such stories are sometimes found in the 
literature on global justice, because they put flesh on the dry 
bones of quantitative data. However, their function is often 
limited to exemplifications. 
The third type is first-person knowledge. It is the 
knowledge we obtain from our own lived experiences. They 
might be poor themselves, exploited or otherwise harmed by 
global injustices – even though most theorists of justice I know 
are well-off academics. Others used to be poor during their 
childhood, were later able to escape poverty but still have vivid 
experiences and memories that they can use to connect their 
theory of global justice to the real world. Global justice 
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theorists might also visit areas where poverty is prevalent: 
favelas, refugee camps or war zones.4 Such first-hand 
experience of poverty is reliable, but in a different sense than 
the scientific third-person knowledge. Academically trained 
philosophers are often aware that their own experiences cannot 
simply be generalized and that in cases of conflict, scientific 
third-person knowledge trumps examples that are only based on 
own experiences. 
I believe it is safe to say that theories of global justice 
most often use a particular form of third-person knowledge, 
which I have described as “big” and “thin” as a basis for their 
approaches – just to name two examples from two different 
approaches: Thomas Pogge (2008) always refers, although 
sometimes critically, to data from the World Bank and other 
global institutions about the hundreds of millions of people 
living in severe poverty to jump-start his arguments for global 
justice as does Gillian Brock (2009) in her discussion about 
global poverty, global justice and taxation. Many, if not most 
theorists of global justice use the statistics on absolute poverty 
provided by the World Bank, or rely on other scientific sources 
that regard causes of poverty, like illicit financial flows, studies 
that analyze the effects of trade agreements or the policies of 
the World Bank, the Monetary Fund or other institutions. A lot 
of this kind of knowledge is hence provided by economists, 
which also illustrates the division of labor between the 
disciplines. Such a reliance on scientific empirical findings is 
problematic for at least two reasons: on the one hand, 
philosophers rarely have any control over the production and 
validation of findings. On the other hand, and despite its 
potentially high relevance, it is far from clear what kind of 
information gets lost by the focus on a particular type of 
knowledge. While we can expect philosophers to be critical 
towards such external sources of knowledge, it would 
overburden them to ask them to be experts on poverty research 
or other forms of empirical knowledge production about global 
injustices. Neither can we expect theories of justice to produce 
their own primary data and analyze it. However, we should – 
and this is what I am arguing for – reflect on the kind of 
information that is lost and consider whether or not it would be 
better to use different types of “windows into reality”, or to 
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have a look at different types of third-person knowledge and 
ask what value the different variants have to offer. The 
argument I want to make in this paper is not to criticize 
reference to third-person knowledge per se, but to broaden the 
perspective and to turn attention to the issues of justice that 
might be present in the usage of certain types of knowledge 
production. 
  
Epistemic Injustices and our Knowledge about Global 
Injustices 
The term epistemic injustice was coined by Miranda Fricker 
(2007), and she divides this concept into two types: testimonial 
and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice, on the one 
hand, occurs when the testimony of a speaker is not trusted 
because of an unjustified prejudice of the hearer. One of 
Fricker’s examples for such an injustice is the case of Tom 
Robinson in Harper Lee’s novel To Kill A Mockingbird. 
Robinson is a black man accused of raping a white girl, and his 
testimony is met with racial prejudice during trial: in the 
context of the racist 1930s in Alabama, where the story takes 
place, a white girl’s testimony is given much more credibility 
than a black man’s testimony. Robinson is unjustly wronged in 
his ability to know, simply for the color of his skin.  
Hermeneutical injustice, on the other hand, occurs when 
persons are wrongfully denied the ability to understand the 
social experience they make. Fricker’s example for this kind of 
epistemic injustice is the inability of a gay man to properly 
understand his desire in the context of a society where 
homosexuality is condemned as a sin. Under such 
circumstances, it can become impossible for a gay man to 
develop a positive relation to himself and his sexual orientation. 
Both testimonial and hermeneutic injustices are not only 
individual instances of injustices, but they are closely tied to 
the social background in which they occur. While testimonial 
injustice denies victims the recognition as a full epistemic 
subject, hermeneutical injustice denies them the possibility to 
understand themselves. Both can have severely harmful 
consequences: they may undermine the status of the victim and 
they can be experienced as humiliating and excluding. 
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How is Fricker’s distinction connected to the issue of 
global justice and to what I said before about the “windows into 
realty” used by theories of global justice? In most theories of 
global justice people living in poverty are underrepresented and 
their testimony is usually not given much space, because those 
theories rely heavily on the certain kind of third-person 
knowledge that I described as “thin” and “big”. It has been 
argued by proponents of participatory research that in such 
“thin” and “big” knowledge people living in poverty are merely 
treated as objects and “units” of analysis and that their 
subjective experience and what they have to say about their 
own situation, how it came about and how it could be 
alleviated, is more or less ignored (Chambers, 2008). There are 
two dimensions to be distinguished here: On the one hand, 
statistics about global poverty, like the one by the World Bank, 
do not adequately represent individual experiences of poverty. 
They merely provide numbers about the amount of people 
living below a certain threshold without telling us anything 
about the individual experiences of living a life under such 
circumstances. Such missing information could be 
counterbalanced by revising the way poverty is measured. 
Better concepts of poverty can be drafted based on 
participatory research that reflects what people living in 
poverty actually view as essential for a better life for them or 
what they are actually missing.5 On the other hand, people 
living in poverty are only marginally reflected within poverty 
research when it comes to recognizing them as subjects and as 
people with a certain level of knowledge. There is a huge gap 
between experts on poverty, who are usually not poor 
themselves, and those actually affected by poverty. Using 
Fricker’s terminology, poor people’s credibility to know 
something about poverty is regularly met with skepticism, 
especially their ideas about its causes and the means to alleviate 
it. One report about participatory research makes clear how this 
should be understood: 
 
Participatory research on poverty is not about 
adding the “subjective” feelings of people living 
in poverty to the researcher’s “objective” 
knowledge. It is not about adding colorful quotes 
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to an existing report which already has its own 
agenda – although this can certainly enliven many 
texts and demonstrate the limits of “policy speak” 
on its own. Nor is it just about people living in 
poverty telling their life-stories. […] What 
participatory practice in research and inquiry into 
poverty is about is putting into practice the belief 
that people in poverty have a right to participate in 
analyzing their own situation and how to tackle it. 
It also means that the perspectives and ideas of 
people experiencing poverty themselves are seen 
as key to achieving a more all-round and in-depth 
understanding of poverty. People in poverty 
should be seen as having a right to take part in 
the debate and a particular expertise in doing so. 
(Bennett & Roberts, 2004, pp. 5-6 emphasis in the 
original) 
 
This also means that the victims of injustices such as global 
poverty are also victims of epistemic injustice, and that they 
have considerably less resources available to overcome both. I 
want to call this a state of double powerlessness, which can also 
be described as the intersection of different forms of 
discrimination and injustice. Most poor people are not only 
poor, but they face challenges due to their gender, race, age or 
health status, which reinforces their low position of being 
viewed as inferior epistemic subjects. The inability to be heard 
by the institutions that undertake poverty research and that are 
involved in designing and implementing poverty alleviation 
policies is furthermore accompanied by hermeneutical injustice 
in a specific sense. Alice O’Connor (2001) has argued that 
poverty knowledge is increasingly focused on counting and 
describing people living in poverty, while it leaves aside 
questions about the problem’s causation as well as its political, 
social and economic background. There is overwhelming 
evidence that many of the people living in poverty internalize 
the blame for being poor and feel themselves responsible for 
their fate, while it is clear that they are not (Jo, 2013). This 
applies to the unemployed social benefit user in Germany or the 
USA as well as to farmers in a country in sub-Saharan Africa 
112 Wagadu Volume 15 Summer 2016 
© Wagadu 2016 ISSN: 1545-6196 
who cannot sell their crop or the sewers working in 
Bangladesh. It is a specific form of hermeneutical injustice, and 
I would even suggest that the victims of global injustice are left 
in the dark as to why they are suffering. Often, they are even 
made believe that it is their own fault, and that they are bad 
mothers or fathers when they are unable to provide for their 
children. Finally, we should expand Fricker’s analysis into the 
direction of processes of invisibilization and silencing of people 
living in poverty. It is not only that poor people are less 
frequently represented in the knowledge production that guides 
the analyses conducted for the purpose of reducing global 
injustices, but they are also often not even asked and heard. 
This is a particular harsh form of testimonial injustice. 
 
“Thinking Small” and “Thick Concepts” 
In this section, I would like to argue for a more balanced usage 
of “windows into reality” in theories of global justice that take 
into account the insights I have presented so far. Some third-
person scientific knowledge, namely that which is “thin,” 
distant and “big”, about global injustices and poverty is not 
unproblematic, (a) because it does not tell us much about the 
lived experience of the victims, (b) because it is produced 
without granting the perspective of the victims much room and 
within power structures that are susceptible to epistemic 
injustice, and (c) because it tends devalue the contributions 
people living in poverty can make to analyze, criticize and 
overcome the injustice from which they suffer. I want to refer 
to two distinct concepts to make my point: David Hulme’s 
(2004) idea of “thinking small” and Clifford Geertz’ (1973) 
notion of a “thick description”. 
Hulme’s paper on “thinking small” introduces and 
analyses the story of Maymana and Mofizul, a couple living in 
a small town in Bangladesh under severely impoverished 
circumstances. Hulme argues that such a “close reading” of a 
single life story is often overlooked in poverty research because 
of the latter’s focus on “thinking big”, meaning that poverty 
research, just like poverty alleviation policies, are primarily 
interested in numbers and figures that provide insights into the 
“average” poor. By contrast, “thinking small” brings to life the 
experience of a single person or family and the struggles they 
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have to face, the reasons for their poverty as well as solutions 
for it. Such knowledge has certain limitations, however, it is 
still an inevitable crucial source of knowledge, first in order to 
understand the suffering of people living in poverty as well as 
its causes, and second in order to conceptualize policies and 
routes out of poverty.6 It is not a question of either or but 
“thinking big” and “thinking small” are needed and should 
complement each other as Hulme writes: 
 
[S]uch grand approaches [thinking big] are not 
unproblematic. Ultimately it is individual people 
who experience the deprivations of poverty, not 
countries or regions. Understanding what happens 
“on average” can be an erroneous basis for 
working out what to do in any specific country, as 
can understanding what happens to the “average” 
poor person or poor household. […] We 
desperately need to continue thinking big about 
poverty, but this must not mask the counter-
balancing need to “think small”. (Hulme, 2004, p. 
162) 
 
I want to call the knowledge that is produced by “thinking 
small”, “small” knowledge in contrast to “big” knowledge. In 
comparison to Hulme’s advocacy for such “small” knowledge 
in poverty research and development studies, Geertz’ idea of a 
“thick description” is already a classical tool in disciplines like 
anthropology, ethnology or sociology (Alexander et al. 2011). 
It was introduced to provide a framework for the research and 
interpretation of empirical findings. A “thin” description of a 
social action is superficial information that contains no 
explanations and little or no context, while a “thick” description 
provides in depth information not only on what is present, but 
also on how and why it exists, by what it is accompanied and 
what kind of emotions and meanings are attached to it. A “thick 
description” embeds the content that is described into its 
context and meaning and reconnects it to those it describes or 
the description of their actions. If a person is sitting on the 
street to beg, this information does only then become a “thick 
description” of poverty, if it is connected to other types of 
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information: why is the person begging, what happened in the 
past that led to this situation, in which context is the person 
begging and what does he or she feel sitting there or what is his 
or her motivation. Joseph G. Ponterotto (2006) has summarized 
the basic pillars of the concept and provides a working 
definition, which shows that a “thick description” is relevant 
for the researcher as well as the reader. 
 
Thick description refers to the researcher’s task of 
both describing and interpreting observed social 
action (and behavior) within its particular context. 
The context can be within a smaller unit (such as a 
couple, a family, a work environment) or within a 
larger unit (such as one’s village, a community, or 
general culture). Thick description accurately 
describes observed social actions and assigns 
purpose and intentionality to these actions, by way 
of the researcher’s understanding and clear 
description of the context under which the social 
actions took place. Thick description captures the 
thoughts and feelings of participants as well as the 
often complex web of relationships among them. 
Thick description leads to thick interpretation, 
which in turns [sic] leads to thick meaning of the 
research findings for the researchers and 
participants themselves, and for the report’s 
intended readership. Thick meaning of findings 
leads readers to a sense of verisimilitude, wherein 
they can cognitively and emotively “place” 
themselves within the research context. 
(Ponterotto, 2006, p. 543) 
 
I suggest that such “thick descriptions” can be understood as 
forms of “thick” knowledge. Both, “small” knowledge (Hulme 
2004) and “thick” knowledge (Geertz 1973), share a similar 
ideal, namely to enrich our knowledge about certain 
phenomena such as poverty by regarding it through the lens of 
a particular, individual story: a life that is struck by poverty and 
still cannot be reduced to it. These approaches highlight that the 
experience of living in poverty is shaped by individual traits 
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and behaviors, by the social context and by tangible and 
intangible infrastructures that may or may not be available to 
the person and his or her family. Another very important 
feature is to aim at understanding the dynamics that take place 
when injustices like poverty occur. People move in and out of 
poverty for various reasons that are only poorly reflected in 
most poverty statistics, and they are active agents within these 
dynamics, even if they are not in full control (Addison, Hulme, 
& Kanbur, 2009). “Small” and “thick” knowledge are both 
produced by scientific inquiry and with the aim to produce 
scientific knowledge in the sense of the third-person knowledge 
I introduced above. These concepts are not just replications of 
testimonies of people living in poverty or other victims of 
injustices, but they embed affected people’s stories into a 
context, they interpret and connect them to other kinds of 
scientific knowledge as well as to the position of the 
researchers themselves. 
“Small” and “thick” knowledge in the sense I described 
them above are types of third-person knowledge, they fall 
under the standards of scientific rigor and they provide third-
persons, like theorists of global justice, with knowledge about 
poverty. What makes “thick” and “small” knowledge different 
from the “thin” and “big” one is that the primary starting point 
for reflections on global justice is that they have a certain 
relation to second-person and first-person knowledge, because 
they try to do justice, epistemic justice so to speak, to the first-
person knowledge of people living in poverty by entering into a 
specific relation to them, that is acquiring second-person 
knowledge. Third-person knowledge is always transformed 
first-person knowledge (of the people living in poverty) and 
second-person knowledge (of the researcher) but “thick” and 
“small” third-person knowledge does so in specific way, and 
with a specific result that aims to give much more substance, 
nuances and depth, and provide the ones who acquire this 
“thick” and “small” third-person knowledge with a different 
kind of “window into reality”. 
 
Empowering the Victims of Global (Epistemic) Injustices 
In this last section, I would like to approach the question how 
we can improve our understanding of global injustices in order 
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to make better theories of global justice. Based on what we 
know about the flaws that are inherent in some types of third-
person knowledge – namely that it is “big” and “thin” – and 
about how it is produced, I would like to argue for a balanced 
approach that does not only aim at counterbalancing such 
knowledge with “small” and “thick” knowledge, but one that 
also acknowledges that the process of acquiring such 
knowledge is in itself valuable, because it empowers people 
living in poverty and recognizes them as full epistemic 
subjects. On the one hand, “small” and “thick” knowledge 
provides theorists of global justice with third-person knowledge 
that is different to the one that is normally used, because it is 
connected to second-person and first-person knowledge, which 
is provided by people living in poverty themselves (which in 
some cases might be the author him/herself). It gives valuable 
insights into the harm of being poor and how people arrange 
their lives under such harsh conditions. It is possible that some 
aspects of theories of global justice will profit less than others 
from integrating such new “windows into reality”, or, to put it 
differently, it will also depend on the level of generality a 
theory argues. I want to consider one example to make that 
point. Monique Deveaux has recently argued that most theories 
of global justice, like the one of Thomas Pogge, are interested 
only in what happens on the institutional level, mainly on 
global institutions and how they should change to alleviate 
global poverty (Deveaux, 2015). That is certainly an important 
aspect and how could that profit from “thick” and “small” 
knowledge? I would want to make three points: Firstly, as 
Deveaux argues, a focus on the institutional setting on the 
global level is in danger of overlooking or downplaying the 
potentials of pro-poor movements and initiatives “on the 
ground”. In this respect, “thick” and “small” knowledge about 
the self-organization of people living in poverty and how they 
can be empowered in local initiatives complements insights or 
claims about what has to happen on the global institutional 
level. Secondly, change on the global institutional level has 
also to be translated into practice in distinct settings and for 
concrete people. This is only possible with “thick” and “small” 
knowledge. If a NGO comes to a village and builds a well so 
that the women in this village no longer have to go two hours 
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per day to get water, this sounds like a very good idea and the 
claim to build this well can be grounded in many different 
theories of global justice. But if it turns out that the women do 
not use this well, even sabotage it, because the two hours per 
day that they have to go to get water are an important time for 
them because they can be away from their husbands and be 
with other women without supervision, then this information is 
highly important to put into practice what global justice 
demands. Yes, it can even turn out that the primary focus of 
global justice in such settings should be on establishing gender 
justice first, because without it the justice-based claims to easy 
access to water cannot be realized. Thirdly, I argue that any 
focus on the global institutional level also has to take a look at 
the set-up of those institutions. Are the experiences of people 
living in poverty heard on that level? Are they giving some 
weight, when it comes to deciding which programs are 
implemented and how? Or do we need to accept that every 
focus on this level necessarily implies acting paternalistically 
towards people living in poverty? It is possible that the claims 
of many theories of justices such as Pogge’s would not change 
on a general level, but they would be complemented and 
deepened, if they would reflect more on these questions and 
come up with different types of injustices that people living in 
poverty face today. 
On the other hand, “thick” and “small” knowledge is 
not only a tool and “window into reality”, but it provides 
information about the agency of people living in poverty, make 
them visible as active agents and subjects, and even as 
epistemic subjects in their own right. This can be connected to 
two ideas: empowerment and recognition. Empowerment can 
be defined as the process to restore or build-up the agency of a 
person whose agency is diminished by the social conditions he 
or she lives in. Hence empowerment is neither identical with 
the means that help to achieve agency, like education or health, 
nor is it identical with the outcome of that process, but it is in 
itself a dynamic phase of change and development (Drydyk, 
2013). “Small” and “thick” knowledge provides insights into 
actual processes of empowerment that are not visible in thin 
data or research methods that are empowering in themselves – 
namely, participatory research that acknowledges people living 
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in poverty as subjects of knowledge production. These concepts 
help to overcome the epistemic powerlessness of people living 
in poverty as described earlier.  
Closely tied to empowerment is the idea of recognition 
as something people living in poverty are entitled to, which 
reflects their agency and what they claim for themselves 
(Schweiger, 2014). Epistemic injustices – and especially 
testimonial injustices in their harshest form of silencing and 
invisibilization – are forms of denied recognition, whether as 
disrespect, humiliation, denigration or exclusion. Through the 
recognition of people living in poverty and other victims of 
global injustices, the problems of silencing and invisibilization 
may be overcome: Recognition gives poor people the 
opportunity to speak-up and to be heard. Furthermore, it 
considers their opinions as valuable and furthermore recognizes 
them as agents of their own lives. This is not only important for 
the process of research on people living in poverty and for the 
ways how we may try to integrate their views into theories of 
global justice, but certainly also for the design and 
implementation of policies and other measures of poverty 
alleviation (Lister, 2004). Finally, such a reshaping of our 
understanding of poverty and other global injustices is also 
important if we want to take an original and different look at 
one central question of global justice, namely the question 
about its agents. I have referred to Monique Deveaux (2015) 
and her argument that most theories of global justice focus too 
heavily on institutions or the rich as agents of justice for people 
living in poverty, while they ignore the options available to 
people living in poverty to improve their situation. This should 
not be interpreted as another way of blaming and shaming 
people living in poverty for their poverty. Rather, it is meant to 
acknowledge that people living in poverty are not only 
epistemically neglected their status as full subjects, but 
discriminated against also in other dimensions. They are 
viewed as helpless, passive and powerless, and while that may 
be true in comparison to other possible agents of justice, such a 
description remains inadequate: People living in poverty are 
never only helpless, passive and powerless, but they are also 
are resistant, active and potentially powerful. 
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How could we achieve such justice for poor people? 
How can they be empowered and recognized? I can only give a 
very brief and general answer to those pressing questions, 
which deserve more attention in future research.  
It would be good to start by attributing responsibilities 
to different agents of justice. I can think of at least three agents 
that are relevant here: The first one is the group of people 
working on global justice like myself. There is plenty of 
participatory research available now and we should just start 
making reference to that when thinking about global justice. 
Most probably, theorizing justice would change if philosophers 
would start reading accounts of people living in poverty and 
taking seriously what they have to say about suffering and 
injustices. The second agent of justice is the heterogeneous 
group of poverty researchers, some of which are actually doing 
a lot of work with people living in poverty. I do not call for 
everyone becoming a participatory researcher, and I also do not 
want to say too much about the inner lives of disciplines and 
institutions that I only know from the outside. Yet, I defend the 
claim that it is a task of the community of people engaged in 
poverty research whether within a university, an NGO, at the 
World Bank or in the UN to reflect the breadth and depth of the 
experiences of people living in poverty and to have their voices 
recorded, preserved and distributed.7  
I chose to say something about two agents of justice that 
have not much power in changing the situation of people living 
in poverty. However, I know that empowerment and 
recognition demand such a change and must not be limited to 
respecting and valuing their voices in our theories. For these 
bigger questions, we need to have a lively political? debate on 
global reforms, about what is feasible, if we should go for 
revolution or start pressuring our own home countries to spend 
more on development aid. 
I want to finish by contemplating one further aspect that 
relates to the meaning of empowering and recognizing people 
living in poverty. My suggestion does not say much about 
giving people living in poverty an active role as being theorists 
– and activists – of global justice themselves. I made a point 
that we – which refers at first to such people as myself, who are 
doing theoretical work on global justice in academic 
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institutions in well-off countries – should give the voices, the 
experiences and the resistance of people living in poverty more 
space in theories of global justice and that we should recognize 
them as invaluable for making better such theories. Another, 
even more radical but nonetheless worthy expansion of my 
claim could also be to argue that people living in poverty 
should be given the opportunities and support to become 
theorists themselves. Certainly this would demand much 
greater efforts than to expand and deepen our knowledge base 
and to open different “windows into reality”. One possible 
more realistic approach could be to give theorists, who are 
“closer” to global poverty, for example because they have 
grown-up in poverty or because they live(d) or work(ed) in 
countries where poverty is much more widespread and visible, 
more space within the academic discussion. It seems as if there 
is now some movement in that direction (Graness, 2015). It is 
to hope that the theoretical work on global justice that is 
produced from peoples’ histories and experiences and that are 
working under different circumstances than those in the rich 
countries, will not be marginalized as embellishments without 
real influence on the mainstream debates that dominate today.8 
 
Conclusions 
I would not want my argument to be understood as claiming 
that we should shift from issues of distribution and inequalities 
in resources to issues of epistemic inequalities.9 It is certainly 
necessary to criticize the injustice of global poverty because it 
hurts people, because it kills people and because this does not 
need to be the case. Approaches to global justice whether they 
are based in human rights, Rawlsian justice, the capabilities 
approach or the utilitarian tradition cannot ignore these facts 
about global poverty and it seems plausible to give them 
serious and lengthy attention. The issues I raised in this paper 
are nonetheless not just minor ones that can be neglected as 
long as the big issues of a fair distribution of resources or goods 
and protecting human rights of all are unresolved. Both demand 
attention, also because both are intertwined as I have tried to 
show. There are good reasons to assume that it is not sufficient 
for global justice to give people living in poverty just more 
resources without paying attention to reaching a level of equal 
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respect and social equality, both which are constituted in the 
process of overcoming epistemic injustices.10 
Notes 
 
1 I borrow the term “big” from David Hulme, who has written 
about thinking big about poverty (Hulme, 2004a). “Big” 
knowledge means knowledge about the condition of a large 
group of people, such as on the national or even global level. 
“Small” knowledge refers to knowledge about an individual or 
a small group of people like a family or a smaller community. I 
will come back to that later. 
2 I use the term “thin” here in opposition to what Clifford 
Geertz has called a “thick” description (Geertz, 1973). A 
description or knowledge is “thin” if it is superficial, stripped 
of its context and its depth, for example, if you say about a 
person that s/he has an income below the poverty line, this does 
not tell you much about how that person actually lives. 
3 It is certainly true that third-person knowledge is produced 
using second-person knowledge. Every statistic and every 
empirical poverty research somehow needs to get in touch with 
people that are poor: They are interviewed, have to fill out a 
questionnaire or tell their life stories. The distinction I am 
interested here is about the knowledge within theories of global 
justice and second-person knowledge is such knowledge that 
theorists acquire if they engage with people living in poverty 
themselves.  
4 Such knowledge is a borderline case between second-person 
and first-person because visiting poor people, even living with 
them for a certain period of time, is not the same as being 
actually poor, because there is no exist option easily available. I 
will not further go into details here because it is not necessary 
for the claim of my paper. 
5 It would be necessary to say much more about the pros and 
cons of participatory research methods and concepts of poverty 
that are based on them (Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith, & Stewart, 
2006). I personally think that a balanced or mixed approach 
that includes participatory research but does not rely on it as the 
only source for conceptualizing and measuring poverty is the 
best available thus far. One example for such a mixed approach 
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based in the capability approach has been argued for and 
applied extensively by Sabina Alkire (2008). 
6 It is worth noting that there is now extensive knowledge 
available that is produced using participatory research methods, 
even the World Bank itself conducting such research on a large 
scale (Narayan-Parker, Chambers, Shah, & Petesch, 2000). It 
would go beyond the scope of this paper to examine the 
fallacies attached to participatory research and how it can also 
be turned into a vehicle of promoting new forms of oppression 
by reducing participation to a technical issue. For such issues 
that are also concerned with the World Bank, see the work of 
Alejandro Leal (2007). 
7 Moreover, it will be necessary in this context to look at the 
wider fallout of the epistemic injustices I examined in this 
paper, for example the often one-sided and biased 
representations of people living in poverty in the media and 
also in schools. 
8 An even more radical approach has been formulated by 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2012). He uses the term of 
cognitive injustice to describe the exclusion of knowledge from 
the global South. He sets out two premises of an epistemology 
of the South: “First, the understanding of the world is much 
broader than the Western understanding of the world. This 
means that the progressive change of the world may also occur 
in ways not foreseen by Western thinking, including critical 
Western thinking (Marxism not excluded). Second, the 
diversity of the world is infinite. […] This immensity of 
alternatives of life, conviviality and interaction with the world 
is largely wasted because the theories and concepts developed 
in the global North and employed in the entire academic world 
do not identify such alternatives. When they do, they do not 
valorize them as being valid contributions towards constructing 
a better society.” (de Sousa Santos, 2012, p. 51) 
9 This mirrors somehow the discussion between Nancy Fraser 
and Axel Honneth (2003) whether we should focus on 
recognition or distribution. One central insight that emerged 
from this debate is, for me at least, that we need to look at both 
and that economic injustices and experiences of misrecognition 
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are often interwoven and go hand in hand. See for that point 
also Fraser (2008).    
10 There is now a strand of philosophers arguing for what they 
call relational or social equality. They presuppose that to have 
an equal standing and not feel of less worth is really important 
for realizing justice (Fourie, Schuppert, & Wallimann-Helmer, 
2015).  Demanding epistemic justice for people living in 
poverty implies this. Conversely, giving people in poverty just 
enough resources so that they are no longer poor, might even 
further cement their status as inferior. 
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